CS代考 CS 161 Computer Security – cscodehelp代写

CS 161 Computer Security
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There is an appendix at the end of this exam, containing descriptions of all C functions used on this exam.
You have 170 minutes, plus a 10-minute buffer for distractions or technical difficulties, for a total of 180 minutes. There are 10 questions of varying credit (200 points total).
The exam is open note. You can use an unlimited number of handwritten cheat sheets, but you must work alone.
Clarifications will be posted on the Exam Tool.
Q1 MANDATORY – Honor Code (5 points) Read the following honor code and type your name on Gradescope.
I understand that I may not collaborate with anyone else on this exam, or cheat in any way. I am aware of the Berkeley Campus Code of Student Conduct and acknowledge that academic misconduct will be reported to the Center for Student Conduct and may further result in, at minimum, negative points on the exam and a corresponding notch on Nick’s demolition tool.
Solution: Everyone gets 5 free points for embracing the suck this semester.
We won’t take any points off if you entered something for a subpart that doesn’t exist, or if you filled in a text box on a multiple-choice question, or vice-versa. To be consistent, we will not consider any unnecessary writing/bubbling on your exam during grading (pretend it’s scratch work).
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Q2 True/false (38 points) Each true/false is worth 2 points.
Q2.1 True or False: WPA2 is a protocol that translates IP addresses to MAC addresses. True False
Q2.2 True or False: Specification-based detection uses a blacklist. True False
Q2.3 True or False: If a pseudorandom number generator (pRNG) is secure, then an attacker who only sees the output of the pRNG is unable to learn its internal state.
True False
Q2.4 TrueorFalse:Argon2andPBKDF2areappropriatealgorithmstousewhenhashingandstoring passwords in a database.
True False
Q2.5 True or False: All forms of two-factor authentication (2FA) are resistant to phishing attacks. True False
Q2.6 TrueorFalse:Loggingisamethodofintrusiondetectioninwhichserverlogfilesarepreserved so they can be asynchronously scanned to detect malicious activity.
Solution: False. ARP translates IP addresses to MAC addresses. WPA2 creates a secure connection at the link layer in a local wireless network and does not use IP addresses at all.
Solution: False.Specification-baseddetectionusesawhitelist.Signature-baseddetectionuses a blacklist.
Solution: True. If the internal state of the PRNG is known, then all future outputs can be predicted.
Solution: True. Argon2 is a slow hashing algorithm specifically designed for hashing pass- words.
Solution: False. The only method of 2FA that is resistant to phishing attacks by design is security keys/WebAuthn/U2F. All other methods are vulnerable to phishing attacks.
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True False
Q2.7 True or False: Cryptographically secure MACs can be constructed using secure cryptographic hash functions.
True False
Q2.8 TrueorFalse:Whenanalyzingacryptographichashingscheme,preimageresistance(one-way) implies collision resistance.
True False
Q2.9 True or False: Sending all DNS requests and responses over HTTPS can be used as an effective defense against censorship by preventing censors from knowing what websites you are visiting.
True False
Q2.10 TrueorFalse:One-timepads,aslongastheyareusedcorrectly,aresecureagainstanadversary with infinite computational power.
True False
Solution: True. This is the definition of logging.
Solution: True. HMAC, a secure MAC construction, is constructed using secure hash func- tions.
Solution: False. Preimage resistance says that given y, it is computationally hard to find any x such that H(x) = y. Collision resistance says that it is computationally hard to find a ̸= b such that H(a) = H(b). While these properties are related, one does not imply the other.
Solution: False. The censor may be unable to see the contents of the DNS response (because it’s encrypted in TLS), but the censor can still see what name servers you’re talking to and deduce what websites you’re visiting. The censor can also see what websites you’re visiting when you make a connection to the actual website.
Solution: True.Aslongasyourkeyisrandomlygenerated,XORingthekeywiththeplaintext will result in a truly random ciphertext.
Formally, given a ciphertext, every single plaintext is equally likely, because each plaintext corresponds to a different key, and each key is equally likely. Even with infinite computational power, an attacker cannot determine what plaintext was sent.
Q2.11 True or False: TLS is able to prevent on-path attackers from learning metadata about your communications (e.g. request and response times, message length) by encrypting communications from a client to a server.
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True False
Q2.12 True or False: Publicly accessible stairs, walkways, and elevators can be considered part of the physical equivalent of a trusted computing base for airport security.
True False
Q2.13 True or False: Clickjacking refers to a class of attacks where the attacker manipulates the user interface of a website to convince the user to click something that they did not intend to click on.
True False
Q2.14 Consider two different detectors with the same false positive rate and false negative rate. Assume that false negatives and false positives are equally costly.
True or False: A website with a high volume of users but a low volume of attacks would benefit more from placing the detectors in series rather than in parallel.
True False
Q2.15 True or False: Signature-based intrusion detection systems are good at identifying novel network attacks that have not been previously seen.
Solution: False.TLSdoesnothidemessagelength.RecallthatTLSusessymmetricencryption to encrypt messages after the plaintext, and symmetric encryption does not hide message length.
Solution: False. None of these items need to be relied upon for the correct functioning of airport security. Things like metal detectors, X-ray scanners, and TSA agents would be considered part of the TCB, since their malfunctioning would affect the effectiveness of airport security.
Solution: True. Clickjacking attacks are often accomplished through the use of JavaScript, CSS, and iframes to create a web page that entices users to click on a dialog they would not otherwise click on.
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Solution: True.Detectorsinseriesproducealowerfalsepositiveratebuthigherfalsenegative rate, which results in lower errors overall due to the high volume of users.
Solution: False.Novelattacksthathavenotbeenseenbeforewillnothaveexistingsignatures. Signature-based IDS does not identifying novel attacks.

Q2.16 True or False: A primary advantage of a host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) over a network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) is that traffic can be analyzed in plaintext, since the host can access decrypted TLS traffic.
True False
Q2.17 True or False: For organizations with a large number of network devices, network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are easier to deploy and manage than host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS).
True False
Q2.18 TrueorFalse:TheUDPprotocolguaranteesthatpacketsaredeliveredtothedestinationserver by detecting dropped packets and retransmitting them until they are acknowledged.
True False
Q2.19 True or False: Alice decides to use Tor to protect herself from tracking and surveillance online. The Tor circuit contains three Tor nodes: an entry node, a relay node, and an exit node. Assume the nodes do not collude. The exit node knows Alice’s IP address but not the domain of the website she is visiting.
True False
Q2.20 True or False: EvanBot is a real bot. (0 points)
Solution: True.ItishardforaNIDStoanalyzeencryptedTLStraffic,becauseTLSisdesigned to be end-to-end secure between the client and server. However, a HIDS is installed directly on the server, so it can access decrypted TLS traffic.
Solution: True. NIDS can be deployed at a single on-path location, while HIDS must be deployed on every single host and kept in sync with the latest rules/signatures/configuration.
Solution: False. UDP is best-effort and provides no delivery guarantees.
Solution: False. Using three nodes in the circuit, the Tor exit node will know the domain of the destination website, but does not know which IP address initiated the request. The exit node only knows the IP address of the middle relay node from which it received the request.
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Solution: True. How dare you doubt our trusty AI.

Q3 Full Stack Security (17 points) Examtool is a test-taking website located at https://exam.cs161.org/. Assume that all network connections are made over HTTPS, unless otherwise specified.
Examtool uses session tokens for user authentication. Session tokens are stored as cookies with Domain=exam.cs161.org and no other cookie attributes (no Secure flag, no HttpOnly flag, Path=/).
When a student fills out or changes an answer, their browser makes a POST request to https://exam.cs161.org/submit_question with the student’s updated answers.
Q3.1 (5 points) Which of the following attacks could allow an adversary to read the session token cookie? Select all that apply.
(A) Reflected XSS attack at https://exam.cs161.org/
(B) Stored XSS attack at https://exam.cs161.org/
(C) Exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the student’s browser
(D) Root access to another device on the same Wi-Fi network that the student is using (E) Root access to the Wi-Fi access point that the student is using
(F) None of the above
Solution: An XSS attack (either stored or reflected) on https://exam.cs161.org would allow the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript on https://exam.cs161.org. JavaScript on https://exam.cs161.org can access a cookie with Domain=exam.cs161.org and no HttpOnly flag. For example, the attacker could use the XSS vulnerability to inject JavaScript that reads the session token cookie and sends its value to the attacker.
An exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code as the browser. If the attacker controls the entire browser application, they could read the cookies stored in the browser.
Root access to another device on the same Wi-Fi network makes the attacker an on-path network attacker. Root access to the Wi-Fi access point makes the attacker a MITM network attacker. However, since the requests are made with HTTPS/TLS, and TLS is end-to-end secure, network attackers will not be able to read cookie values (which are encrypted in TLS).
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Q3.2 (4points) Foraquestiononanexam,Alicefirstsubmits“A”andthenlaterchangesheranswerand submits “B”. What could a MITM attacker between Alice’s computer and the exam.cs161.org server do? Select all that apply.
(G) Perform a DoS attack to prevent Alice from submitting an answer choice (H) Perform a replay attack to restore Alice’s saved answer to “A”
(I) Modify Alice’s submitted answer choice to “C”
(J) Run JavaScript in Alice’s browser

(K) None of the above
Solution: HTTPS/TLSisend-to-endsecure,soaMITMattackercannotmodifythecontentof Alice’s message. This prevents an attacker from modifying Alice’s answer choice (the contents of the message). The attacker also cannot modify the response from the server to send some JavaScript to Alice’s browser.
However, TLS does not guarantee availability, so a MITM could prevent Alice’s request from reaching the server. For example, the MITM could use TCP RST injection to end the TLS connection (remember that TLS runs on top of TCP).
Q3.3 (4 points) Suppose the MITM attacker has identified a vulnerability in HTTPS that allows them to arbitrarily read and modify data in transit without detection. Alice submits another answer. What could a MITM attacker between Alice’s computer and the exam.cs161.org server do? Select all that apply.
(A) Set cookie values for the page at https://exam.cs161.org/ (B) Redirect Alice’s browser to https://evil.com/
(C) Access any file on Alice’s computer
(D) Change Alice’s answer choice without detection
(E) None of the above
Solution: The MITM attacker can now modify the contents of Alice’s message and change Alice’s answer choice.
The MITM can also modify the contents of the server’s response to send some Javascript to Alice’s browser. This Javascript looks like it came from https://exam.cs161.org, so it could set a cookie for https://exam.cs161.org. Javascript can also redirect Alice to another website.
Remember that browsers are sandboxed, so JavaScript from a website cannot access files on Alice’s computer.
The following subparts are independent of the previous subparts.
An instructor uploads an exam to Examtool by applying some cryptography to the exam and sending it over an insecure channel.
• m is the message to encrypt (i.e. the exam).
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• ∥ is concatenation.
• k1 and k2 are two different secret keys known only to the Examtool server and the instructor. • E(k, m) is the encryption function of an IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption scheme.
• MAC(k, m) is a secure MAC function.
For each pair of cryptographic schemes, select the scheme with fewer potential vulnerabilities. Q3.4 (2 points) Select the more secure scheme:
(G) C = C1∥C2, where C1 = E(k1, m) and C2 = MAC(k1, C1) (H) C = C1∥C2, where C1 = E(k1, m) and C2 = MAC(k2, C1) (I)
Q3.5 (2 points) Select the more secure scheme:
(A) C = C1∥C2, where C1 = E(k1, m) and C2 = MAC(k2, C1)
(B) C = E(k1, m||MAC(k2, m)) (C)
Solution: The first option reuses a key k1 in two different algorithms. The second option uses different keys k1 and k2 for two different algorithms. Key reuse is insecure, so the second option is more secure.
Solution: As shown in lecture, encrypt-then-MAC is more secure than MAC-then-encrypt.
The first option is encrypt-then-MAC, because the message is encrypted first, and then the MAC is applied on the ciphertext. The second option is MAC-then-encrypt, because the plaintext is MAC’d first, and then the message and MAC are encrypted.
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Q4.1 (5 points) In the same-origin policy, which of the following are used in determining the origin of an HTTP webpage? Select all that apply.
(A) IP (C) Protocol (E) Request path
(B) Port (D) Domain name (F) None of the above
Q4.2 (3 points) Bear Bank is concerned that the ABtesters JavaScript library could steal customer passwords from the login form if the JavaScript library were compromised. Is this a valid concern?
(G) Yes, because the ABtesters JavaScript library executes with the origin of ABtester’s webpage.
(H) Yes, because the ABtesters JavaScript library executes with the origin of Bear Bank’s webpage.
(I) No, because https://cdn.abtesters.com uses a certificate that is signed for different domain name.
(J) No, because the ABtesters JavaScript library can only execute specific JavaScript functions required for its basic functionality.
(3points) BearBankdecidestomovetheloginformtohttps://auth.bearbank.comandembed it on the homepage (https://bearbank.com/) in an iframe.
“Bank-Grade” Security (28 points) Bear Bank is using a third-party analytics service called ABtesters. To use it, the bank website includes a tag to load the ABtesters JavaScript library.
Bear Bank’s website is located at https://bearbank.com and contains the following HTML:

Solution: Web content’s origin is defined by the scheme (protocol), host (domain), and port of the URL used to access it. Two objects have the same origin only when the scheme, host, and port all match.
Solution: JavaScript inherits the origin of the page that loads it, so the ABtesters library will have the same origin as bearbank.com. This lets the ABtesters JavaScript access elements on bearbank.com, such as the login form.
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Can the ABtesters JavaScript library running on Bear Bank’s homepage steal customer passwords from the login form in the iframe?
(A) Yes, because the ABtesters JavaScript library is running on the same page as the iframe.
(B) Yes, because the ABtesters JavaScript library can execute any JavaScript it wants on the Bear Bank’s homepage.
(C) No, because the ABtesters JavaScript library is not developed by Bear Bank itself.
(D) No, because the ABtesters JavaScript library has a different origin than the login form. (E)
After a user successfully logs into their account, Bear Bank’s website sets a session_token cookie to track the user’s logged in status and allows users to transfer funds by making a GET request to https://bearbank.com/transfer.
Q4.4 (3 points) Which of the following cookie attributes would cause the session_token cookie to be sent in a request to https://bearbank.com/transfer? Select all that apply.
(G) Domain=bearbank.com; Path=/transactions
(H) Domain=bearbank.com; Path=/transfer; Secure
(I) Domain=auth.bearbank.com; Path=/login; HttpOnly; Secure (J) None of the above
Solution: No. iframes have the origin of the website that’s being loaded, so the login form (domain auth.bearbank.com) inside the iframe has a different origin from the JavaScript library (domain bearbank.com) outside the iframe. The ABtesters JavaScript library outside the iframe will not be able to directly interact with the login form inside the iframe.
Solution: The browser sends a cookie to a given URL if the cookie’s Domain attribute is a domain-suffix of the URL domain, and the cookie’s Path attribute is a prefix of the URL path. In other words, the URL domain should end in the cookie’s Domain attribute, and the URL path should begin with the cookie’s Path attribute.
The first option will not be sent because the cookie path /transactions does not match the website path /transfer.
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The second option will be sent because the domain and path both match, and the request is over HTTPS (so the Secure flag does not stop the cookie from being sent).
The third option will not be sent because the cookie path /login does not match the website path /transfer.
Note that the HttpOnly flag prevents cookies from being loaded by JavaScript, so it is irrelevant here.
Q4.5 (3points) BearBankrealizesthattherearenoCSRFprotectionsonthetransferform,whichmeans attackers can steal money from users’ accounts.
Which of the following are reliable defenses against CSRF attacks? Select all that apply.
Clarification during exam: Everyone will receive credit for this question because we did not specify what it means for a defense to be “reliable.”
(A) Add a random CSRF token to the transfer form each time the page loads
(B) Check the referrer header on the server when processing the transfer form submission (C) Move the transfer form to an iframe hosted at https://transfer.bearbank.com (D) None of the above
Solution: The definition of “reliable” was not clear, so we gave everyone points for this question.
The intended solution was:
As discussed in lecture, CSRF tokens and checking the referer headers are valid CSRF defenses.
Submitting the transform form with a POST request is not a valid CSRF defense, be

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